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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
United States v. Meulener: Hijacking Prevention, the
Fourth Amendment, and the Right To Travel
A ticket agent in a large city airport determined that defendant, Meulener,
who was carrying a small suitcase, matched the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration Profile designed to detect possible hijackers. Accordingly, the ticket
agent notified a U.S. marshal monitoring a magnetometer in the passage-
way leading to the aircraft, and as the defendant passed through the mag-
netometer registered the presence of metal, whereupon the marshal detained
the defendant and prohibited him from boarding the plane or leaving the
airport. Before attempting to search Meulener's person and before informing
him that he could refuse to submit to the search provided he did not board
the aircraft, the marshal ordered him to open his suitcase. After hesitating,
he opened it and the marshal discovered a plastic bag containing marijuana.
Meulener was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute. Prior to trial, on defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, the
United States district court held: The search of an airline passenger is con-
stitutionally permissible only if he is apprised of his right to avoid the search
should he choose not to board the plane. Furthermore, the search of a
passenger's carry-on luggage is constitutionally permissible only if a pat-
down of the passenger's outer clothing seeking the object which activated
the magnetometer proves fruitless. United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp.
1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
I. "STOP" AND "FRISK": THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, TERRY, AND SIBRON
The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . ... - Implied in the standard of "reason-
ableness" is a scale of probability that the person has been, or is about to
be, engaged in criminal activity. Along this scale are various degrees of
probability justifying different types of intrusions upon the privacy of the
individual. Highest on the scale are the classic probable cause levels that
justify the issuance of search warrants. Lowest on the scale lies the investi-
gative stop and protective frisk, and the airport search.2
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio3 enunciated the "stop
and frisk" doctrine. In Terry a police officer observed two men pacing back
and forth in front of a store. When the two joined a third person, the offi-
cer, suspecting the men of "casing a stick up" approached the three and
asked for their identification. When they failed to reply, the officer spun
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1094 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
3 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a detailed analysis of Terry v. Ohio and its impact, see
LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MIcH. L. Rav. 40 (1968); Comment, Stop and Frisk, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 837
(1969); Comment, Terry Revisited and the Law of Stop-and-Frisk in Texas, 27 Sw.
L.J. 490 (1973); Comment, Stop and Frisk: Invasion of Privacy Without Probable
Cause, 4 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 284 (1970); Note, "Stop and Frisk" Under the Fourth
Amendment: Terry and Sibron, 6 U. HoUSTON L. REV. 333 (1968).
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Terry around, patted down his outer clothing and discovered an object he
believed to be a weapon, and upon reaching into the defendant's clothing
discovered a concealed weapon. There was neither probable cause for an
arrest nor for a search, but only what the Court termed "suspicious circum-
stances."'4  It was held that the limitations of the fourth amendment were
applicable to police conduct which falls short of a technical arrest, 5 and,
therefore, such conduct must be tested against the fourth amendment's re-
quirement of reasonableness.0  The Court prescribed three criteria for de-
termining what constitutes reasonable police conduct in stop and frisk en-
counters. One must analyze the governmental interest justifying the in-
trusion, the specific and articulable facts which reasonably warrant the in-
trusion, and the extent of invasion. 7  Relying on these standards, the Court
held that the governmental interest in the prevention of crime and protection
of the officer from persons who a police officer would reasonably believe to
be armed and whose conduct is suspicious is sufficient to justify a limited
search for weapons.8 The Court adopted reasonable suspicion as a justi-
fication for this lesser governmental intrusion.9  However, the Supreme
Court cautioned that the fourth amendment limits the scope of the intrusion
as well as its initiation. Specific facts must give rise to the suspicion of the
officer; he cannot act upon what the Court termed an "inarticulate hunch."
The intrusion based only upon reasonable suspicion must be restricted to a
pat-down of the outer clothing until further facts are discovered justifying
a full-blown search. 10
In Sibron v. New York" the Supreme Court reiterated its holding that
4 392 U.S. at 30.
5Id. at 19.
61d. at 20.
7 Id. at 20-21. The reviewing court should determine the reasonableness of the
officer's conduct by examining the governmental interest which allegedly justifies the
intrusion into the constitutionally protected privacy of the individual. The test for
determining reasonableness consists of balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails. The Supreme Court further stated:
[To justify the intrusion] the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion . . . . [1]n making
that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief'
that the action taken was appropriate? . .. Anything less would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on . . .inarticulate
hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.
Id. at 21-22.
8 Id. at 30-31.
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reason-
ably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be afoot and that persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and .. .dangerous, [and] where
• . . [he] makes reasonable inquiries .. .he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons ....
Id. The Court held that the officer was reasonably prudent in assuming that individuals
contemplating robbery would be likely to use weapons. Id. at 28.
9 Id. at 26-27.
10 Id. at 29. Since the justification of the search is for the protection of the officer
and others, it must be limited to an intrusion designed to discover weapons. Thus,
evidence discovered in a frisk which extends beyond its permissible scope is inadmissible.
Id.
11 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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frisks based merely on inarticulate hunches were not permissible. In Sibron
the officer observed the defendant conversing with several persons whom the
officer knew to be drug addicts. The subsequent search of the defendant
was held to be without probable cause, 12 and, relying on Terry, the Court
held that the mere act of talking to narcotics addicts was not the type of
specific and articulable fact from which an officer could reasonably infer
that the individual was armed and dangerous. 13
II. THE TERRY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO AIRPORT SEARCHES
Airplane hijacking has been described as the "escalating criminal phe-
nomenon of our times" 14 and a continuing hazard to public travel.15  In
response to increased skyjacking incidents, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion developed a pre-boarding passenger surveillance system.16 The sur-
veillance system provided the following procedures: (1) If the passenger
meets the profile, he is kept under surveillance by airline employees. (2)
If the passenger activates a magnetometer installed in the entrance to the
boarding gate and conforms to the profile, he is interviewed by airline per-
sonnel. (3) If satisfactory identification is not produced during the inter-
view a frisk is conducted by a U.S. marshal.17
United States v. Lopez' s was the first case to consider the constitutionality
of airport screening procedures. In Lopez an airline ticket agent deter-
mined that the defendant fitted the FAA hijacker profile. While attempting
to board the aircraft the defendant activated a magnetometer and was un-
able to produce proper identification.' 9 The defendant was subsequently
frisked and a packet of heroin discovered. The Lopez court summarily con-
cluded that it was not feasible to obtain a warrant for an airport search
due to the exigency of time,20 and determined that the only judicially de-
veloped exception applicable to the airport search was the protective frisk
for weapons upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.21
12 1d. at 62.
13 Id. at 64. Also, the officer's statement to Sibron, "You know what I am after,"
indicated that the officer sought narcotics rather than a weapon. Id.
14 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972).
15 Id. at 669.
16 United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The system
utilizes two informational aids, a profile of the average potential hijacker and an
electronic search by a metal detective magnetometer. Id. The profile characteristics
are based on the behavioral patterns of embarking passengers rather than on inherited
or social characteristics and are of necessity secret to prevent potential hijackers from
modifying their behavior to avoid matching the profile. The magnetometer reacts to
ferrous metal such as coins, keys, cigarette lighters, etc., and, therefore, is activated by
approximately 50% of all passengers who pass through it. Id. at 1086.
17 Id. at 1086. Some airlines have modified the screening procedures and monitor
the magnetometer only when the passenger matches the profile. Others search the
effects of each passenger which is followed by a magnetometer search of all air pas-
sengers. Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 CoLUM.
L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1971).
18 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
19 Neither the Lopez opinion nor any other case explains what would constitute
proper identification or the effect that producing such documents would have upon
the prevention of hijacking.
20 328 F. Supp. at 1092.
21 Id. at 1092-93. The court discussed the judicially developed exceptions to the
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Relying on Terry, certain factors to be considered in determining the con-
stitutionality of airport searches were delineated: (1) the objective evi-
dence available to the officer from the profile, magnetometer, and inter-
view; (2) the degree of probability that the individual was dangerous; (3)
the determination of whether the probability level justified the frisk, bal-
ancing the manner in which the frisk was conducted, the extent of the inva-
sion of privacy, and the risk to the officer and others. 22  The court held
that properly administered screening procedures using the profile and mag-
netometer were statistically accurate in detecting illegal conduct and thus
warranted the airport stop and frisk. 23  The governmental interest in pre-
serving safe air travel justified the use of the profile and magnetometer, out-
weighed the minimal inconvenience to a small number of passengers, and
was reasonable. 24  However, the court cautioned that the use of the mag-
netometer alone may not satisfy the "specific and articulable facts" require-
ment of Terry and could go beyond constitutional limits. 25
However, in United States v. Epperson26 the use of a magnetometer alone
was held to be constitutional. While the use of the magnetometer was a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, it was held to be a
lesser intrusion than a physical search, 27 and justified by the imminent dan-
ger and exigent circumstances. 28 Relying on Terry and Lopez, the court up-
held the frisk conducted subsequently to the defendant's activating the mag-
netometer as being justified for the protection of "others" as well as the
officer.29
Following the rationale of Epperson, the Third Circuit in United States
v. Slocum 30 also upheld the use of the magnetometer alone despite the fact
that in that case the defendant both met the profile and activated the mag-
search warrant requirement. Implied consent was discounted as grounds for the search
since the Government cannot condition the exercise of the passenger's constitutional
right to travel on the voluntary relinquishment of his fourth amendment rights. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969). The court also discounted a
search incident to an arrest since the arrest was not made until after the frisk was
completed and the contraband seized. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20(1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). There was no evidence that
the officer was in "hot pursuit" of the defendant, Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), nor was there danger of imminent destruction of evidence,Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Similarly, 'since there was no apparent
offense committed in the presence of the investigating officer, Sibron v. New York,392 U.S. 40 (1968), and no contraband was in plain view, Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234 (1968), these exceptions were rejected.
22 328 F. Supp. at 1097.23 1d. at 1100.
24 See 328 F. Supp. at 1097.2
5Id. at 1100.
26 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972). When the defend-
ant passed through a magnetometer, it gave an unusually high reading. The defendant
was frisked and a pistol was found in his jacket. Since there was no antecedent profile
designation of the defendant, the only basis for the stop and frisk was the magnetometer
response. Id. at 770.
27 Id. at 770. The use of the device, unlike a frisk, cannot be "an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience" since the person scrutinized is usually
not even aware of the examination. Id. at 771.
28 Id. at 771.
29 Id. at 772.
30464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972).
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netometer. When a frisk yielded no metal, the officer inspected the de-
fendant's carry-on luggage and discovered narcotics. The court excused the
warrant requirement because of the great danger, overwhelming govern-
mental interest, and minimal invasion of privacy.3 1 The justification for the
magnetometer search was found to exist independent of the profile.32 The
profile did not establish a basis for the subsequent use of the magnetometer,
nor was its use to be restricted by fourth amendment standards.83 The use
of the magnetometer and the limited search were justified by a reasonable
governmental interest in protecting air commerce.3 4 Further, the court ex-
tended the scope of the warrantless search to include hand luggage if the
frisk of the individual's person fails to explain the magnetometer reading.
However, the court strongly emphasized that this extension was applicable
only after the frisk failed to account for the activation of the magnetometer. 35
One author has concluded that Terry cannot be constitutionally extended
to inarticulate hunches of the type supplied by a profile and magnetom-
eter.30 This argument is based upon the lack of specific and articulable
facts required by Terry and Sibron.37 Reliance on the profile has been
described as an "inarticulate hunch" because fourteen of fifteen persons
matching it are found to be unarmed.38 As the magnetometer may be ac-
tivated by virtually any ferrous metal object, it is activated by approximately
fifty percent of all passengers screened. Thus, it is contended that because
of the inaccuracy of both the profile and the magnetometer, they provide
no more articulable facts than those the Supreme Court rejected in Sibron.3a
It also appears that the later cases such as Epperson and Slocum have di-
luted the requirement of specific and articulable facts of Terry.40
III. UNITED STATES V. MEULENER
United States v. Meulener initially considered the constitutional grounds
which could justify the airport search in question in the absence of a search
warrant. 41 The court determined that probable cause for arrest was lacking
and discounted the theory that there was either express or implied consent.
Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,42 express vol-





35 Id. at 1183.
36 McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41
FoRD. L. REV. 293, 320 (1972).
37 See note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
88 McGinley & Downs, supra note 36, at 314. The profile does not purport to
identify potential hijackers, but is rather a means of identification for further surveil-
lance. It is contended that demonstrating characteristics which may also have been
exhibited by a significant number of hijackers is not sufficient to justify an invasion
of the individual's privacy. Id. See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
89 McGinley & Downs, supra note 36, at 314. See also note 16 supra.
40 McGinley & Downs, supra note 36, at 314-15.
41 351 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
42 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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meaning "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. 43
To meet constitutional requirements, "the consent must be . . . voluntary,
unequivocal, specific and intelligently given rather than resulting from duress
or coercion, whether actual or implied. '44  The Meulener court thus con-
cluded that the search was coercive because of the marshal's order to the
defendant to open his suitcase. 45  The court likewise was not persuaded by
the Government's argument that Meulener's attempt to board amounted to
implied consent in light of the presence of signs at the boarding gate stating
that passengers and baggage were subject to search. This proposition was
rejected, not only because the consent did not meet the constitutional stand-
ards, but also because the right to travel cannot be conditioned upon the
relinquishment of fourth amendment rights.46
The court, relying on Terry and Sibron, noted that the type of search in
question, initiated as a result of a positive reaction to the magnetometer and
profile, would be constitutional, provided it was circumscribed by the ex-
igencies justifying its initiation and was confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover weapons. 47 In applying Terry to the airport
search, Slocum, Lopez, and Epperson were relied upon to uphold the use
of the profile and magnetometer. 48  The decision thus followed the line of
cases which narrowed the Terry doctrine into a two-criteria standard, and
seemingly diluted the requirement for specific and articulable facts by ac-
cepting the profile and magnetometer readings as such facts.49 As has been
noted, such a modified interpretation of Terry appears unconstitutional. 50
However, the Meulener decision went beyond Slocum, Lopez, and Ep-
person, and for the first time in an airport search case held that for such a
search to meet fourth amendment guarantees, the prospective passenger
must be expressly advised that he may refuse to submit to search, provided
he does not board the plane.5' Conforming to the profile and activating
the magnetometer were held to warrant a forced search only if the person
chose to board the plane. The court, by not requiring submission to a
search, attempted to avoid the unique fourth amendment standard for pro-
spective passengers at airline boarding gates established by earlier cases.52
The basis for this departure was that the governmental interest justifying
a limited search of a person and hand luggage was to prevent air piracy, and
such justification arises only from the marshal's reasonable fear for the safety
3 351 F. Supp. at 1287, quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
44 Id. See also Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d
657, 663 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963).
45 351 F. Supp. at 1288.
46 id. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47 351 F. Supp. at 1289.
48 Id. at 1288-89; see notes 23, 27, 32 supra, and accompanying text.
49 Id. at 1289; see notes 36-40 supra, and accompanying text.50 See notes 36-40, and accompanying text.
51 351 F. Supp. at 1289-90.
52 Id. at 1289. Lopez held that once the profile is met and the magnetometer acti-
vated, grounds for a forced search are established whether the passenger wants to
board the plane or not. Epperson and Slocum held that activation of the magnetometer
alone was sufficient grounds for a forced search. Id.
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of the passengers. Accordingly, the court reasoned that if the suspect does
not board the plane, the danger to the passengers and crew is obviated and
the governmental interest justifying the search no longer exists.5 3 The gov-
ernmental interest justifying the need for intrusion was weighed against the
degree of invasion of privacy, 54 and it was apparently concluded that the
intrusion based upon the modified interpretation of Terry went beyond con-
stitutionally permissible limits. By redefining the need for intrusion and fo-
cusing on the governmental interest involved, the court hoped to restore
constitutionality to the doctrine by giving the passenger an opportunity to
retain his privacy. However, in its attempt to protect the passenger's fourth
amendment rights, the court did not give complete consideration to the ef-
fect of its holding on the constitutional right to travel.
Prior to the decision of Meulener it had been suggested that a passenger's
right to air travel could be conditioned on his consenting to be searched prior
to embarkation since fourth amendment rights may be waived by unequivo-
cal and voluntary consent.5 5 Several authors have rejected this suggestion
for two reasons. First, the consent does not meet constitutional standards
because it is inherently coercive-a refusal to accede to an airport search
will result in a denial of passage.5 6 It is evident that passengers possessing
the type of articles being sought would submit to such searches only under
duress, thus rendering the waiver involuntary.57 Second, the Government
cannot condition the prospective passenger's constitutionally protected right
to travel upon the relinquishment of his fourth amendment rights.5 The
Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson59 emphatically asserted that such
was unconstitutional, stating: "This Court long ago recognized that the na-
ture of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which un-
reasonably burden or restrict this movement."60  Shapiro has also exerted
an influence upon the other airport search cases. For example, Lopez, re-
lying on the Shapiro opinion, held that the Government cannot condition
the exercise of the passenger's constitutional right to travel on the relinquish-
ment of his fourth amendment rights in the context of an airport search. 61
Further, the argument that there are alternative modes of travel is invalid
as flying may be the only practical means of transportation. 62
53 Id. at 1289.
54 See id.
55 Note, supra note 17, at 1047-48; see McGinley & Downs, supra note 36, at 321-22.56 Note, supra note 17, at 1048.
57 Id.
18 328 F. Supp. at 1093. See also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1896); McGin-
ley & Downs, supra note 36, at 322.
59 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
60 Id. at 629. The Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary to ascribe the
right to travel to a particular constitutional provision. It occupies a position "funda-
mental to the concept of our Federal Union" and was conceived from the beginning
"to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created." Id.
at 630-31.61 328 F. Supp. at 1093.
62 McGinley & Downs, supra note 36, at 322.
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The reasoning of Meulener, however appears to be self-contradictory. On
the one hand the decision excluded implied consent as a possible basis
for the search as not meeting constitutional standards for waiver of fourth
amendment rights and because it conditioned the exercise of the right to
travel upon relinquishment of those rights. 63 Yet the effect of the holding
is to permit searches to be conducted upon express consent which likewise
seems to fall short of the constitutional requirements for the same reasons,
that is, it is inherently coercive and the exercise of the right to travel is
conditioned upon such consent being given. The rule formulated by Meu-
lener appears to incorporate both of these constitutionally impermissible
actions while on its face disclaiming them.
The Federal District Court for the Central District of California began for-
mulating the basis for its requirement in Meulener, that the prospective pas-
senger be advised that he may avoid the search should he choose not to
board, by looking to United States v. Allen,64 decided by the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of California less than six weeks prior to
Meulener. In Allen a defendant who matched the profile checked his suit-
case at the counter and proceeded to the gate where he activated the mag-
netometer. Upon request, he permitted a frisk which yielded no weapons.
His suitcase was then brought to the investigating office and the agents asked
for the defendant's consent to search it. Believing the options to be to con-
sent to a search, or arrest, the defendant acquiesced and the officers found
contraband drugs. The search was held to be illegal, there being neither
probable cause nor a voluntary consent.65 Relying on the Lopez holding that
the Government cannot condition the exercise of the defendant's constitu-
tional right to travel on the voluntary relinquishment of his fourth amend-
ment rights,"6 the proposition that the defendant had impliedly consented by
presenting himself for boarding was rejected. But the court seems to have
contradicted itself and in dictum indicated that express consent would be
valid, stating that:
While this court has no doubt that airline authorities have an absolute
right to require a passenger to submit to a search of his person and
baggage as a condition to boarding the aircraft, it accepts the conclu-
sion reached in Lopez that in order to be a valid waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights a passenger must be aware of his option to avoid
the search by not boarding. 7
The Meulener holding implements the dictum of Allen and the result is
that the airline has the right to require the passenger to waive his fourth
amendment right as a condition of exercise of his right to travel. Even
though such a consent will be coercive, as it is required as a condition prece-
dent to boarding, it will be upheld so long as the passenger is aware of his
right to avoid the search if he does not board. Meulener is significant be-
63 See notes 42-46 supra, and accompanying text.
64 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
65 Id. at 753.
66 328 F. Supp. at 1092-93.
67 349 F. Supp. at 752 (emphasis in original).
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cause it is the first airport search decision to require that the passenger be
expressly warned prior to a frisk that he need not submit to the search, but
that should he refuse he will not be permitted to board the plane. This
formulation thus seems to depart from the modified interpretation of Terry
which permits a search, without regard to consent, if the passenger meets
the profile and activates the magnetometer. The Meulener court, by au-
thorizing a search only if the passenger chooses to board the plane after
being apprised of his right to avoid the search, appears to shift the grounds
upon which the search is based. In reality the search is no longer based
upon Terry, but rather upon the coerced consent and waiver of the pas-
senger's fourth amendment rights as a condition to the exercise of his right
to travel. It should be noted, however, that the consent required in Meu-
lener seems to differ from the normal consent in the classic search situation.
In the normal consent case, probable cause is lacking and the consent serves
as a substitute basis for the search. In Meulener there was no govern-
mental interest to justify the intrusion until the passenger consented by de-
ciding to board after being warned he would be searched if he did. The
consent thus supplied an essential prerequisite for the search rather than
being a substitute for that prerequisite as in the classic consent situation.
Aside from the constitutionally infirm consent grounds, the Meulener
court also found that there was a second, independent ground for holding
the search invalid. The search was not properly limited in scope as re-
quired by Terry and Sibron.68 The court stressed that the search approved
in Terry consisted of a frisk of the outer clothing of the suspect for weapons
and only when the pat-down revealed such objects was it permissible for the
officer to place his hands in the defendant's pockets. By analogy, in this
case an unsuccessful pat-down of the defendant would be required in order
to search the luggage. Further, it was noted that Sibron held the search
unconstitutional because a limited exploration for weapons was not made
before the officer put his hands into the defendant's pocket. In all prior
federal cases upholding airport searches the scope of the search was ini-
tially restricted to a limited frisk of the outer clothing for weapons.69 The
only other case in which the passenger's carry-on luggage was searched
was United States v. Slocum,7 0 which held the search proper, emphasizing
that it was only after the frisk failed to disclose anything which might have
triggered the magnetometer that the marshal requested that defendant open
his luggage. 71 The Slocum court thus implied that the search would have
been improper without the frisk.
The Meulener court correctly relied on the reasoning of Terry and Sibron
and expressly held that the officer's failure to make an initial frisk of the
defendant's outer clothing before searching his suitcase was in violation of
the fourth amendment because a frisk which discloses the metal object re-
68 See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
69 351 F. Supp. at 1291.
70 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972). In Slocum the defendant walked through the





sponsible for activating the magnetometer obviates the need to search the
suitcase. 72 However, if the search is grounded on consent, as Meulener im-
plies, Terry appears to be wholly inapplicable. Thus it is arguable that if
the Government deems it necessary, consent to search hand luggage as well
as person could be required if the passenger chooses to board the plane.
The effect of such a requirement would be to impose a much heavier burden
upon, and more severely restrict, the right to travel which the Supreme Court
has held to be essential to our form of government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the holding in Meulener should have significant
effect upon current surveillance procedures. Meulener requires that subse-
quent to meeting the profile and activating the magnetometer, and prior to
being frisked, the passenger be given a warning that he need not submit
to the search, but that without such he would not be permitted to board the
plane. If the passenger elects to proceed, he is deemed to have consented to
the search. Further, as most airports currently search all carry-on baggage
prior to the passenger's passing through the magnetometer or any frisk of the
outer clothing, current screening procedures appear to extend beyond the
constitutional limits of Meulener.
The Supreme Court has yet to review an airport search and seizure based
upon the profile and magnetometer. However, as evidenced by Meulener,
the federal courts are in conflict, the constitutional issues have become more
acute, and review by the high court appears imminent. If the Supreme
Court reviews a Meulener-type situation, it will have to confront two major
constitutional issues. First, whether a profile which is accurate only six
percent of the time and a magnetometer which is activated by fifty percent
of embarking passengers sufficiently meets the requirement of "specific and
articulable facts" set forth in Terry and refined in Sibron.73 If the Supreme
Court strictly applies Terry, it appears the search cannot be upheld. If,
however, the Court determines that the surveillance system satisfies Terry
in the context of an airport search, then it must deal with the second issue,
whether it will permit the conditioning of the right to travel upon the re-
linquishment of fourth amendment rights. It is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will modify Terry and significantly dilute a fundamental right in the
same day.
Steven J. Corey
72 351 F. Supp. at 1292.





AN INVITATION TO EMPLOYERS
The School of Law of Southern Methodist University invites attorneys,
firms, corporations, banking institutions, government agencies and other
prospective employers to use the Law School Placement Office to make
contact with its students and graduates.
PROCEDURE FOR INTERVIEWS
Employers who wish to interview at the
School of Law during the coming year should
telephone or write the Placement Office as
far in advance as possible, giving preferred
and alternate dates. The telephone number
is Area Code 214, 692-2622. The Placement
Office will reserve conference rooms at the
School, will supply resumes if the students
have prepared them, and will arrange for
overnight accommodations for the interviewer,
if desired.
Interviews may be scheduled Mondays
through Fridays during the academic year, ex-
cept during examination periods. Many rep-
resentatives visit the School during the au-
tumn interview period. Therefore the reserva-
tion of autumn interview dates should be ar-
ranged some months in advance.
Many members of the June graduating class
will have accepted employment by January
Ist.
EMPLOYERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO SEND
DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR FIRMS AND ANY
OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION FOR STU-
DENTS TO READ PRIOR TO THE INTER-
VIEWS; our experience indicates that such
descriptions can sometimes materially in-
crease the student response for particular
openings. A file of firm resumes and job
descriptions is maintained for student refer-
ence throughout the year.
PROCEDURE AND PLACEMENT
NOTICES
Employers who do not plan to send repre-
sentatives to the School but who wish to hire
new associates are invited to mail or tele-
phone their job descriptions for posting on
the placement bulletin board. Information
about interested and qualified candidates
will be furnished by mail, and the candidates
will be invited to communicate directly with
the employer.
The Placement Office will not reveal a stu-
dent's or a graduate's rank in class or law
school average without the consent of the
student or graduate having first been ob-
tained.
The Placement Office will indicate to pro-
spective employers in which quintile of his
class an individual graduated or is currently
ranked.
FURTHER INQUIRY
The Law School Placement Office invites
inquiries and suggestions relative to place-
ment. Please address correspondence to:
Placement Office
SMU School of Law
153 Storey Hall
Dallas, Texas 75222
